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1 Introduction: Various Forms of the “Why not” 
Question 
 
A question that comes first to mind when many people speak of Chinese science 
and natural philosophy is the so-called “why not” question, namely, 1) “Why did 
the Scientific Revolution not take place in China?” or 2) “Why did modern sci-
ence not develop independently in China?” When I say, usually during quite 
casual occasions, that I am working on Chinese science, this is almost always the 
first question that people come up with to confront me.  
The question was first asked by the Chinese themselves in the late nineteenth 
                                                 
1
 Various earlier versions of this paper were presented in seminars, colloquia, and as 
lectures over the past few years at the University of Munich (Institute for East Asian 
Studies), University of Tübingen (Seminar for Sinology and Korean Studies), National 
Tsinghua University at Hsinchu (Institute of History), Seoul National University (History 
Faculty Seminar), The Academy of Korean Studies (Department of Philosophy), Tokyo 
Institute of Technology (Science and Technology Studies), Tsinghua University at Beijing 
(Institute of Science, Technology and Society), and at the Ninth International Conference 
for the History of Science in China (Hong Kong). I would like to acknowledge the bene-
fits I drew from the discussions on these occasions. Critical comments of one of the refe-
rees helped me see problems existing in the manuscript and clarify a number of points. 
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and early twentieth centuries, when China fell prey to Western powers. The Chi-
nese of the time felt that this was largely because of the successful development 
in the West of science and technology, which the Chinese themselves had failed 
to develop, at least not in the “right” direction. This perception led many Chinese 
to strive for the strengthening and enriching of their country by developing sci-
ence and technology. But it also made them ask why science and technology were 
not developed in China. Some even asked a more extreme form of the question. 
Fung Yu-lan, for example, titled one of his articles as “Why China has no sci-
ence?”2  
Gradually, however, people came to realize that scientific and technological 
traditions did exist in China that were fairly sophisticated and advanced, and as a 
result various different forms of the question have emerged. Joseph Needham, 
perhaps the one most responsible for such a shift in the general evaluation of 
Chinese scientific achievements, has put the question in the following way: Why 
did China fail “to give rise to distinctively modern science while having been in 
many ways ahead of Europe for some fourteen previous centuries”?3  
There have, of course, been other forms of the question, some of which are 
quite interesting. Some have asked more specifically why the scientific activities 
in China did not continue or prevail. For example, Robert S. Cohen, a philoso-
pher, phrased the question as: “China amply, confidently and splendidly reached 
the threshold of modern science and technology but no further, and why not?”4 
For another philosopher, Arnold Koslow, the question is: “Why, given the state 
of knowledge in Ancient and Medieval China, was there a discontinuance rather 
than a continuation of the tradition in (say) optics, acoustics, and mathematics?”5 
A historian of the Scientific Revolution, H. Floris Cohen, asked: “Could a  
Galileo have emerged in China, and if so, could he have prevailed?”6 Sometimes 
a potential answer to the question is expressed in the form of a “why not” ques-
tion: “Why did scientific activity become functionally differentiated and institu-
tionalized in Western Europe and not in China or elsewhere?”7 What may be the 
most neutral, but perhaps the least interesting, form is my own: “Why did the 
Chinese develop their knowledge of the natural world in the way they did and not 
in the way the Europeans developed modern science?”8  
In this paper, rather than asking, and trying to answer, the “why not” question 
                                                 
2
 Fung (1922). Homer H. Dubs even referred to the Chinese “failure to produce phi-
losophical systems”: Dubs (1928). 
3
 E.g. Needham (1974), p. xxiii. Of course, Needham formulated the question in 
many different ways. Sal P. Restivo, for example, identified twelve such “formulations.” 
See Restivo (1979), pp. 43-44 (appendix A). 
4
 Robert S. Cohen (1973), p. 104. 
5
 Koslow (1975), p. 185. 
6
 H. Floris Cohen (1994), p. 483. 
7
 Restivo (1979), p. 29. 
8
 Kim (1982), p. 103. 
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again, I shall examine the problems—both theoretical and practical—involved in 
asking and answering the question. I shall look at various criticisms of the ques-
tion and examine the validity of such criticisms. I shall take the question as an 
example of the general question, “why not an event E in culture A?”, and show 
how the natures of the event E and the culture A influence the way one goes 
about dealing with the question. Problems can be found not just in the question 
but in the answers that people have looked for and have come up with. I shall 
also examine such problems. Finally, I shall consider the ways in which the ques-
tion and answers to it can be, and have been, useful in spite of so many problems. 
I shall end the paper with a discussion of what can be called the “Korean why not 
question.” 
My purpose in doing all this is to suggest that we cannot afford to write off 
the “why not” question. The widespread awareness of the potential problems of 
the question in the past few decades has discouraged students of the history of 
Chinese science from asking the question itself. We now see hardly anyone rais-
ing the question in serious professional discussions, except for occasional exami-
nations of the legitimacy of asking the question itself that usually end in banning 
the question as an illegitimate question to discuss. An unfortunate consequence of 
this, however, is that while the scholars in the field, in all possibilities the very 
ones most qualified to ask the question, and most prepared to deal with the dan-
gers involved in asking the question, are abstaining from asking it, numerous 
others are asking, and answering, the question. 
 
 
2 Targets of the “Why not” Question 
 
The first thing we may note about the “why not” question is that it is not asked 
with respect to just any culture. Typically, it is asked with respect to a culture  
1) when the science of the culture seemed so close to a “Scientific Revolution” 
but did not cross the “threshold”; or 2) when other areas of the culture were so 
advanced that it makes one wonder why its science was not so. Actually, China, 
India, and Islam are just about the only cultures for which this grand question is 
asked, and of these, China is by far the most frequent target of the question. It is 
obvious that for many people China appears to meet both of the above two crite-
ria. 1) For a long period in Chinese history there were traditions of science and 
technology at quite advanced levels, such as calendrical astronomy, mathematics, 
medicine, pharmacology, harmonics, and various techniques. 2) The Chinese 
have shown abundant activities and impressive achievements in other cultural 
areas, like philosophy, arts, government, industry and economy.9  
On a more restricted scale, the question is also asked for such other cultures 
                                                 
9
 This was especially so in the eleventh century during the Song, the period which 
some scholars even characterized as “the early modern” China. See, e.g., Reischauer and 
Fairbank (1958), pp. 220-225. 
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as those of seventeenth-century China, the Sejong (r. 1418-1450) era of Korea, 
and Tokugawa Japan.10 Sometimes the “why not” question turns into questions 
of “why stagnate” or “why decline”: “Why did science stagnate (or decline) in a 
culture?” And this “why stagnate/decline” question has been asked, for example, 
for the sciences of ancient Greece, Islam, Ming China, and the post-Sejong pe-
riod of Korea, etc.11  
 
 
3 Problems in the Question 
 
Some see problems in the question itself, and wonders whether it can be a mean-
ingful question at all.  
 
 
3.1 Inherent Problems and Underlying Assumptions 
 
Problems can be found concerning all three components of the question: 
1) “why not”; 2) “Scientific Revolution”; 3) “in China”. Many are, for example, 
sceptical about the term “Scientific Revolution”, and wonder whether it is a 
meaningful term even in the West.12 Some question the validity of the notion of 
the “Grand Divide” between “China and the West” as the basis for historical 
analysis.13 But even if one leaves aside such scepticisms that have become fash-
ionable in recent years, and admits that one can, as I shall do in the remainder of 
this paper, legitimately speak of “Scientific Revolution” and compare “the West” 
and “China,” there is a problem inherent in the first component of the question, 
namely whether it is meaningful to ask why something did not happen.  
To illustrate the problem A. C. Graham came up with the striking analogy of 
a house-fire. Noting that when a house caught fire one does not go through all the 
other houses in the street explaining why they did not catch fire, he asked why 
one should do a similar thing in the case of the Scientific Revolution? Naturally, 
he went on to argue that what needs to be asked is not “why the Scientific Revo-
lution did not” take place somewhere, but “why it did” take place where it did, 
                                                 
10
 E.g., Sivin (1973); Chŏn (1966), pp. 23-25; Bartholomew (1976). 
11
 For discussions of such questions, see, e.g., H. F. Cohen (1994), Section 4.2; Sabra 
(1987); Hart (forthcoming); Pak (1995), esp. pp. 165-166. It should be noted that, in 
speaking of these questions, I am not implying that decline and stagnation are the sole 
alternatives to scientific revolution. The science of a society can continue to grow at a 
slow pace without leading to revolutionary breakthroughs. 
12
 Shapin (1996), “introduction”; Lindberg (1990). 
13
 Hart (1999). Karine Chemla also raised this question while commenting upon an 
earlier, oral, version of the present paper. 
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i.e. in Europe.14  
The basic criticism along these lines is that in asking why an event E did not 
take place, the question contains the implied assumption that it is natural that E 
should have happened. In the case of the “why not (a) Scientific Revolution” 
question, for example, the implied assumption is that the Scientific Revolution is 
something that should occur in every culture at a certain stage of its scientific 
development. And we know that this assumption is mistaken, for, as Graham 
points out, nowhere was the Scientific Revolution an event that had to occur 
naturally, not even in Western Europe where it actually occurred.  
 
 
3.2 “Why E” = “Why Not (Not E)” 
 
Yet, the above criticisms do not constitute a sufficient reason for us to avoid the 
“why not” question altogether. We can still ask the question while not accepting 
the sort of assumptions above. Furthermore, if anyone, based on such a theoreti-
cal criticism of the “why not” type question, insists that only the “why” question 
should be asked, I have an equally theoretical counter-argument, namely that 
there cannot be an absolute distinction between the “why” and the “why not” 
questions, for one can take any “why” question and turn it into a “why not” ques-
tion:  
 
 “why E” = “why not (not E).” 
 
Should we, then, criticize those asking “why E” for asking a “why not” question, 
namely “why not (not E)”, and thus for assuming it natural that “not E” should 
have happened (or that E should not have happened)?  
The above equation, although it may appear strange at first sight, is quite 
plausible in the cases where “not E” is more natural than E, for then one will 
want to ask about the causes for the less natural event of “not (not E)”, which is 
E. The “why the Scientific Revolution” question could be considered such a case, 
because, as we have noted, the Scientific Revolution is not an event that can be 
expected to occur naturally in any culture: indeed, it can be said that it is more 
natural for a culture not to have a Scientific Revolution. Thus, one may naturally 
ask a “why not [not E]” question: “Why did Western Europe not enjoy the natu-
ral state of not having the Scientific Revolution?” An interesting example of 
asking this form of the question is William Theodore de Bary’s following re-
mark, which, though it might at first appear odd, contains a wholly natural ques-
tion to ask, and thus nicely supports my point here. 
 
... it could be asked, in slightly modified non-Western terms 
(in this case, the normative Neo-Confucian language of East 
                                                 
14
 Graham (1973). The “house-fire” analogy appears on p. 51. 
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Asia): why could the West not measure up to the civilized 
behavior of Confucian East Asia? Why did it not act in a 
mature, responsible way by getting its own house in order 
and staying home, as China, Japan, and Korea were doing, 
rather than chasing around the world to make trouble for 
others?15 
 
In fact, many events in history can be of this sort. Unless one has a sufficient 
reason to consider any given historical event “E1” as a natural, or even an inevi-
table, event to occur in every culture, “not E1” could be considered more likely. 
Of course, assuming “not E1” and asking “why not (not E1)” is a more plausible 
thing to do in such cases, rather than assuming “E1” and asking “why not E1.” 
Nevertheless, asking “why E1” can in principle be criticized for asking a “why 
not” question (why not [not E1]) and as a case of an assumption (that “not E1” 
should have happened) underlying the question. 
 
 
3.3 The Nature of the Scientific Revolution 
 
The above discussion must have made it sufficiently clear that in asking and 
answering “why not E,” a great deal depends on the nature of E. One’s notion of 
the nature of an event that did not happen influences greatly the way one goes 
about dealing with the question of “why it did not happen.” 
Yet, E in the “why not E” question is not an event that can be discussed in 
isolation—in general, abstract terms—it is a concrete event in a particular cul-
tural setting. In other words, what we refer to as “why not E” really is “why not E 
in culture A.” It thus depends very much on the culture about which the question 
is asked. 
For example, in asking “why not E” one can distinguish a culture in which E 
did not happen but still could have happened on the one hand, and a culture in 
which E could not have happened at all on the other. Some think that Islam and 
China were different in this respect: when E is the Scientific Revolution, Islam is 
the former kind of culture, and China the latter. Among other things, it is noted 
that Islamic culture shares some intellectual foundations with the West, which did 
undergo the Scientific Revolution.16 If we accept this, we can conclude that, of 
the two non-Western cultures, considerations of Islamic culture will yield inter-
cultural understanding more readily transferable to the situation in the West. But 
this argument involves the same kind of assumptions as have been criticized in 
the previous subsection.  
Perhaps one may be tempted to consider the Scientific Revolution to be an 
event that could have occurred only in Western Europe of the sixteenth and sev-
                                                 
15
 de Bary (1988), p. 68. 
16
 H. F. Cohen (1994), p. 143. 
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enteenth centuries, and then the question will not need to be asked with respect to 
other cultures. But if we do not go that far and admit that it can happen in cul-
tures other than early modern Europe, what kind of “Scientific Revolution” are 
we talking about when we ask the “why not (a) Scientific Revolution” question? 
Are we speaking of the Scientific Revolution (E) that actually happened in West-
ern Europe (B)? When we know that E happened in B and ask “why not E in A,” 
are we asking “why not [E in B] in A”? In other words, is there only one particu-
lar form of E (“E in B,” namely the E which actually happened in B) that can 
happen anywhere in the world? And if so, can it happen in other cultures—can 
“E in B” happen in A? Or is it possible that there is more than one form of E? For 
example, can there be a form of E which is different from the actual “E in B” and 
that can still happen somewhere in the world (although it actually did not happen 
anywhere)?  
One aspect of the Scientific Revolution can be noted in this connection, 
namely that the peaks of the developments in Europe that constituted the Scien-
tific Revolution were not followed by consolidations or stagnations, or even 
declines. That was what actually happened in nearly all other cases of scientific 
flourishing in history—ancient Greece, medieval Islam, and Song China, for 
example. Indeed, this pattern of intermittent growth between periods of stagna-
tion, and even decline, is much more common than what happened in Europe 
after the Scientific Revolution. It is notable, then, that unlike those other cases 
where a flourishing scientific development reached a peak after a while and then 
slowed down in a few hundred years, the developments that had begun during the 
European Scientific Revolution continued and even accelerated. And they spread 
over the rest of the world.17  
 
 
3.4 Misunderstanding the Scientific Revolution 
 
Naturally, a misunderstanding of E in the question “why not E” will pose prob-
lems. For example, inaccurate understanding of what happened in Europe during, 
and before the Scientific Revolution has led to all sorts of wrongheaded specula-
tions concerning the “why not (a) Scientific Revolution” question. The most 
frequently found such misunderstanding is the assumption that the sciences of all 
traditional cultures were more or less similar up to the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, just before the Scientific Revolution, and that after this only European 
science took off. We know that this is wrong; we know that there were in fact a 
lot of differences—both in content and in context—between medieval Western 
science and traditional Chinese science. 
                                                 
17
 To be sure, if we look at individual countries like Italy or England, there were in-
deed periods of stagnation and decline. But science flourished in other parts of Europe. 
One may ask whether the pluralism of Europe helped maintain the pace, or even acceler-
ate it, as is commonly assumed. 
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One notable such difference was that in the medieval West natural philosophy 
was accepted by the universities and formed an essential part of their curriculum. 
Natural phenomena were thus frequently discussed, and often became subjects of 
heated debates among the medieval schoolmen. The situation was very different 
in traditional China. This is not to say that subjects dealing with the natural world 
were not accepted by the intellectual mainstream in China. They were accepted; 
or at least, they were not excluded. Nor is it my point that objects and phenomena 
in the natural world were unimportant to traditional Chinese thinkers. They were 
important also. The point is, rather, that they were unproblematic. Natural objects 
and phenomena were not excluded, but were taken for granted, and hence simply 
accepted as they were observed, reported, or recorded. It is for this reason that, 
while there were heated discussions and long-running debates on moral and so-
cial problems among traditional Chinese thinkers, natural phenomena were not 
very often discussed or debated in this manner. Natural philosophy did not be-
long to the list of subjects for which they showed much enthusiasm.18 
A corollary of this misunderstanding of taking all traditional sciences to be 
more or less the same is the belief that modern science came about owing to a 
new scientific methodology. For Needham and for many others, for example, 
modern science was the result of the combination of mathematics and experimen-
tation.19 We know, of course, that the real situation was a lot more complicated. 
Another kind of such misunderstanding is the belief that continuation of scientific 
development would have eventually produced a Scientific Revolution. Concern-
ing this we may ask, as Arnold Koslow has done, “Why should Chinese [scien-
tific] traditions, even if they continued, broadened, and deepened, lead to what 
has been called modern science?”20 Still another kind of misunderstanding is to 
confuse scientific development (revolution) and technological development 
(revolution). Many factors have been proposed that could be significant in ex-
plaining the development of technology, but not that of science, which in tradi-
tional China, as in most other traditional cultures, was an activity largely separate 
from technology. Benjamin Nelson has noted, for example, that it is easy to see 
some roles played by capitalistic interest in technical utilization of scientific 
knowledge, but not so to see its role in science per se.21  
                                                 
18
 This is evident, for example, in the manner in which Zhu Xi 朱 熹 (1130-1200), 
the creator of the so-called “Neo-Confucian synthesis,” discussed natural phenomena. 
Frequently, he spoke of them not for their own intrinsic interest, but for some external 
purposes. He alluded to familiar and obvious natural phenomena mainly in dealing with 
certain moral and social problems, drawing analogies between these natural phenomena 
and usually rather complex and difficult moral and social problems. Only rarely did he 
mention such common natural phenomena for their own sake. For more detailed discus-
sion of this point, see Kim (2000a), pp. 3-4. 
19
 E.g., Needham (1959), pp. 150-168. 
20
 Koslow (1975), p. 185. 
21
 Nelson (1974), p. 463. 
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These are only the more frequent examples of misunderstandings concerning 
what happened in the Scientific Revolution. Such misunderstandings have misled 
numerous questioners and answerers of the “why not” question, and their readers. 
But still, this does not constitute a sufficient reason to ban the question; it only 
emphasizes the importance of having an accurate understanding of the nature of 
E when asking “why not E.”  
 
 
3.5 “Why Stagnate/Decline” Question 
 
In principle, the “why stagnate” or “why decline” questions suffer from the same 
problems that have been discussed concerning the “why not” question. One par-
ticular aspect becomes significant for these types of question, namely the appar-
ent connection of the flourishing and the decline of a culture at large and that of 
the science of that culture. We may ask whether science continues to flourish 
while all other areas are in decline—in ancient Rome, for example. If it can, it 
may mean that science is a unique branch of culture, different from other 
branches.22 But we can also ask the reverse question: can science alone decline 
in a culture while other areas of the culture flourish? As we have noted in section 
2, asking the “why not” question presupposes not only that it can, but also that it 
actually did in China.  
Another point to be noted is that while “stagnation” or “decline” of science 
may often be the result of rejection and suppression, it is not always so. Fre-
quently, stagnation or decline is the result of simple neglect, or ignoring, rather 
than active rejection or suppression. Sometimes it can result from an acceptance 
followed by isolation and stabilization. We can think of the sciences in Islam and 
in post-Song China as examples of such cases of decline resulting from isolation 
or stabilization. In the former case, science was accepted by isolated, marginal 
intellectual circles of society; in the latter, scientific knowledge entered, and 
became part of, the comprehensive corpus of learning, and was taken for granted 
by the intellectual mainstream.23  
 
 
4 Problems in the Answers 
 
It is not only in the question that problems have been found. They have also been 
found in the answers people have looked for, and have found. 
 
                                                 
22
 One such example would be elite competition sports. Can science, or certain as-
pects of science, then, be considered to be similar to elite competition sports? 
23
 Sabra (1987); Kim (2000a), pp. 6-8; Kim (forthcoming). 
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4.1 Answers Required for the “Why Not” Question  
 
There have been problems in ideas about the conditions that the answers to the 
“why not” question should satisfy, in other words, in the notions people have 
concerning the kind of answers the question requires. Some think that what is 
required as answers to the “why not” question are “causes” that can provide a 
rigorous causal explanation. H. F. Cohen illustrates this problem by rephrasing 
the “why not” question of ancient Greek science in the following manner: “What, 
in other words, was absent from Greek science that was indispensable for bring-
ing forth early modern science?”24 
But this is usually not what we are looking for when we ask the “why not” 
question. For example, in asking “why not E in A,” we are not looking for neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for E to occur, ones which did not exist in culture 
A and thus prevented E from occurring in A (or caused “not E” in A).25 After all, 
we do not seek such “causes” when we ask “why” questions in history: “Why the 
French Revolution?”, “Why the Ming collapse?”, for example. And what people 
have actually come up with as answers to this kind of question are not necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions, but are various other sorts of things: influences, 
reinforcements, correlations, connections, linkages, and even coincidences, for 
example. There is no reason, then, that we should insist that we should find more 
rigorously causal “causes” for the case of the “why not” question. 
 
 
4.2 The Problem of “Inhibiting” Factors 
 
Many attempts to produce answers to the “why not” question have suffered from 
a common problem, namely that of seeking “inhibiting” factors as answers to the 
question. It is a problem because this amounts to saying that a factor inhibited 
something that was not happening, and thus makes one wonder whether it means 
that the Scientific Revolution was about to happen, or was in progress, in China, 
and then was inhibited by the inhibiting factor. What is more serious, however, is 
that the inhibiting factors people have suggested as answers to the question have 
                                                 
24
 H. F. Cohen (1994), p. 242. 
25
 After considering science in Islam, H. F. Cohen lists four features that affect the 
development of science in general, of which three are given in the form of necessary 
conditions for a Scientific Revolution to occur: 1) “that science not be perceived by the 
community at large as being directly opposite to its core values”; 2) the existence of “at 
least semi-professional cluster of scientists who exude a deep and abiding belief in the 
value and dignity of their own life’s work”; and 3) that “no Scientific Revolution is feasi-
ble ... in lands thoroughly destroyed by bands of foreign invaders.” The fourth feature 
speaks of conditions that would give a society “a decisive advantage when it comes to 
preparing the ground for early modern science.” See H. F. Cohen (1994), p. 417. 
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frequently been the absence, rather than the presence of certain factors. For ex-
ample, the inhibiting factors suggested so far have included the absence in China 
of such ideas as causality, laws of nature and a creator-god, such methodological 
elements as proof, formal logic, geometry, symbolic algebra, and experiment, and 
such social and cultural factors as capitalism, urbanization, the merchant class, 
slavery, universities, organized religion, individualism, tolerance, etc. 26  But 
taking the absence of something as an inhibiting factor really amounts to saying 
that the absence of a factor inhibited something which did not happen after all.27 
 
 
4.3 Mistaken Assumptions and Other Problems 
 
A still more serious problem that can be found in the answers given so far to the 
“why not” question is the one that has plagued comparative historians of science, 
namely the assumption that a factor, an aspect, or a situation should play the 
same role in every culture, in particular the assumption that the factors that were 
significant in Western scientific development are the factors that must have af-
fected the development of the sciences of China in the same ways also. That this 
assumption is mistaken can easily be seen from the simple fact that many aspects 
or situations similar to the ones suggested as answers to the Chinese “why not” 
question were present in the West before the Scientific Revolution, but did not 
prevent the development of modern science there.28 
Obviously derived from the above sort of assumption is a frequently found 
trend to attribute the supposed lack of scientific development in China to the 
                                                 
26
 For discussions of these and many other factors, see, e.g., Needham (1969); Bodde 
(1991); H. F. Cohen (1994), Section 6.5. A rare exception in which presence of a factor 
was given as an inhibiting cause was the bureaucracy. For discussions of the role of the 
bureaucracy in Chinese scientific development, see, in addition to the above cited works, 
Kim (2000b). 
27
 Along this line, Nathan Sivin has identified “two fallacies” frequently found in in-
tercultural comparisons: 1) taking an earlier state as “necessary condition”; 2) taking later 
absence as a result of “inhibiting.” See Sivin (1982), p. 56. 
28
 Taking the example of the supposed inhibiting role of the “scholar-bureaucrat 
class,” Nathan Sivin has underpinned this point in the following manner: 
 
But in Europe at the onset of the Scientific Revolution we 
are faced with the predominance of the Schoolmen and 
dons, immersed in books, face toward the past, and oriented 
toward human institutions rather than toward Nature. They 
did not prevent the great changes that swept over Europe. It 
would take a more imaginative historian than myself to say 
whether those changes would have taken place sooner had 
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different characteristics of some cultural elements or aspects in China from those 
in the West. Examples are numerous: the Chinese conception of cyclical time vs. 
the Western conception of linear time; the non-inflective Chinese language vs. 
the inflective Western languages; the strength of Chinese mathematics in algebra 
vs. the Western strength in geometry; the Chinese inclination to wave theory vs. 
the Western particulate theory in explaining physical phenomena, and so on.29  
There are, of course, other problems that can be found in the answers that 
have come up so far. In an interesting philosophical analysis of the problems 
involved in answering the question, Robert S. Cohen wonders: “what is the sort 
of connection which can affect one layer of social action by thought, feeling or 
action at another layer?”30 He points out, for example, the difficulty of establish-
ing the comparability of cultural variables in different historical settings. He 
criticizes the “fuzziness” of the answers, or the “imprecise characterization and 
explanatory status of cultural variables” contained in the answers. For some of 
these variables may be merely “intervening variables, convenient conceptual 
stand-ins” that have to be replaced later, and some even candidates of “why” and 
“why not” questions.31 He also points out the problems in what he calls the 
“causal conditional arguments” employed in these discussions.32  
The problems discussed in this section underline the real dangers faced by 
those who try to answer the “why not” question. Numerous attempts to answer 
the question have been misled because of these problems. Yet, the existence of 
the problems should not lead us to reject the question itself. They only remind us 
that we should be mindful of the dangers in answering the question, especially of 
coming up with simple, easy answers. 
 
 
5 Contribution of the Question  
 
There is still another problem—perhaps the most conspicuous problem—with the 
question, which is that so many people keep asking this question that has so many 
problems. The questioners include not just laymen, but many scholars also; in 
fact, nearly everyone interested in Chinese culture has asked and answered the 
question. And this situation is likely to continue. We might succeed in persuading 
one another to avoid asking the question, or at least to wait until the time when 
we understand enough—which, by the way, will never happen! But meanwhile 
the question will not go away, and numerous other people will ask and answer the 
question. Why do people keep asking this question? 
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 E.g., see Needham (1969); Bodde (1991); and H. F. Cohen (1994). 
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 R. S. Cohen (1973), p. 106. 
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 R. S. Cohen (1973), pp. 108-109. 
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It is difficult to deny that many people, at least those who keep asking it, must 
have felt that the question has some contribution to make to a better understand-
ing of something, be it scientific development in China (or in other places), the 
nature of scientific enterprise, Chinese culture in general, or something else 
again. Can we discount their feelings by simply saying that they should not suc-
cumb to such feelings because the “why not” question cannot contribute anything 
to their understanding? Can we say for sure that the question has indeed made no 
contribution to the field of Chinese science? I do not believe we should be so 
negative in assessing the contribution of the question.  
A undeniable contribution of the “why not” question is that it has provoked 
interest in Chinese science for many people, and an  initial motivation for many 
who work in the field—whether they recognize it or not. It is only after grappling 
with the question for some time that they come to realize the problems in ask-
ing—and answering—the question. For example, only after asking the question, 
and trying out various answers to it, do they realize the danger involved in assum-
ing that the Scientific Revolution is what should happen at some stage of every 
culture. 
Another important contribution made by the “why not” question is that it has 
led many historians of Chinese science to consider, while trying to find answers 
to the question, not only the contents but the contexts of Chinese science. The 
belief of many of them that the answer to the question should be found mainly in 
factors external to science itself—intellectual, social, institutional, and other 
cultural factors—is not entirely correct. But such belief has encouraged—and 
will continue to encourage—much good work on the role of such factors in the 
development of science in China. 
The question has also led many people to do comparative history of science, 
because the answers to the “why not” question are usually based upon, and some-
times tested by, comparative analyses of the situations in different cultures, usu-
ally comparisons with Europe, where the Scientific Revolution did take place. 
Such comparisons, when carried out prudently, have contributed greatly to a 
better understanding of the various differences between the two cultures, and 
eventually to a better understanding of the two cultures themselves. The differ-
ences we have seen between the two cultures in concepts of time, language, the 
nature of mathematics, and so on, were the fruits of such comparisons.33  
Perhaps the most important contribution, however, should be found in the an-
swers that people have come up with so far. And that is the way it should be after 
all. Whatever problems they may have as answers to the “why not” question, 
numerous factors, aspects or situations in traditional Chinese science, society, 
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 More recently, G. E. R. Lloyd has described the difference in the dominant modes 
of intellectual argument between the two cultures, noting Chinese appeal to authority vs. 
the Western predilection for “polemical argumentation.” See Lloyd (1996). 
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and culture have been suggested, studied and discussed.34 To be sure, any one 
factor, aspect or situation by itself cannot be the whole answer. But each of these 
factors can explain, at least to some extent, the lack of the scientific development 
or the absence of the Scientific Revolution. It will be difficult to say that a par-
ticular factor did not—or even could not—have any effect in the development of 
science in China, or anywhere else. Indeed, the factor did exert an effect on sci-
entific development in a concrete, particular (peculiar) historical context of tradi-
tional Chinese culture and society. And as the result of those various factors 
appearing together in such historical contexts, and acting together in combination 
in very complicated ways, they affected Chinese scientific development in certain 
ways.  
It is quite likely, then, that in trying to answer the “why not” question, we will 
end up by amassing almost all the factors, aspects and situations in China that 
were different from those of the West. What we do in presenting our answer, 
combining all these factors, may be nothing more than pointing to a different 
“civilizational setting,” “cultural orientation,” and “life-way” of the Chinese, to 
use Benjamin Nelson’s expressions.35 In other words, the answer will amount to 
saying essentially that “China was different from the West in numerous ways, and 
because of these differences the Scientific Revolution did not occur in China.” Or 
if we push it further, it may even become: “the Scientific Revolution did not 
occur in China because China was different from the West.” Of course, we do not 
need to ask the “why not” question, and to labour on at all of these answers to 
reach this sort of obvious conclusion. What is important, however, is that we will 
have learned a lot in the course of reaching this seemingly trivial conclusion. And 
come to think of it, can our ultimate conclusion be really different in any essential 




                                                 
34
 Sal P. Restivo has found, in Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China alone, 
some twenty-nine “factors inhibiting the emergence of modern science in China and 
Western Europe,” and thirty-three “factors conducive to the emergence of modern sci-
ence.” See Restivo (1979), pp. 44-47 (Appendixes B and C). 
35
 Nelson (1974), pp. 460-463. Nelson sees in the cities, universities, professions, es-
tates, etc. of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the “seedbed of modern European soci-
ety” (p. 459), and describes the situation in the following terms: 
 
It is ... the time when new images and horizons of con-
science, self, person, society, the cosmos, action, justice, 
forms of rule, institutions of law and learning take on a cast 
that have ever since been distinctive and primary features of 
the Western European world. (p. 464) 
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6 Postscript: The “Korean Why Not Question” 
 
I will end the paper by considering a related question concerning Korea, a ques-
tion that can be called “the Korean why not question”: “Why did Korean science, 
which had reached the highest level in the world in the early fifteenth century, not 
continue to progress, but stagnate and decline instead?”36 Of course, this ques-
tion will have all the problems that we have found in the case of the Chinese 
“why not” question. But there is an additional problem that should be considered 
for the Korean case. In dealing with the “stagnation” and “decline” of Korean 
science and technology in the post-Sejong period, for example, can the historian 
ignore the situation in China at the time? What were the levels of the Chinese 
scientific ideas and techniques that Koreans of the Sejong period adopted? How 
did they change in China in subsequent times? If Chinese science and technology 
did stagnate or decline, was it possible for Korean science and technology to 
continue to develop independently? There are quite a few Korean scholars who 
seem to think so, and it is not impossible in principle for science to continue to 
develop, or even to flourish, in a peripheral area of a culture while it is declining 
at the centre. But if that is impossible, would that reduce the Korean “why not” 
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